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Abstract: Estimates of Indian GDP are constructed from the output side for 1600-
1871, and combined with population data. Indian per capita GDP declined steadily 
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries before stabilising during the 
nineteenth century. As British growth increased from the mid-seventeenth century, 
India fell increasingly behind. Whereas in 1600, Indian per capita GDP was over 60 
per cent of the British level, by 1871 it had fallen to less than 15 per cent. These 
estimates place the origins of the Great Divergence firmly in the early modern period, 
but also suggest a relatively prosperous India at the height of the Mughal Empire. 
They also suggest a period of “strong” deindustrialisation during the first three 
decades of the nineteenth century, with a small decline of industrial output rather than 
just a declining share of industry in economic activity. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Recently, there has been much progress in reconstructing the historical national 
accounts of a number of European countries during the early modern and even the late 
medieval periods (Broadberry et al., 2011; Broadberry et al., 2013; van Zanden and 
van Leeuwen, 2012; Malanima, 2011; Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Escosura, 
2013). This paper applies similar methods to Asia, providing estimates of Indian GDP 
for the period before 1871. There is a strong need for estimates of Indian GDP during 
the early colonial period, to assess the strong revisionist claims about Indian 
economic performance made recently in the context of the Great Divergence debate. 
Parthasarathi (1998; 2011) has made the most striking claims for south India during 
the eighteenth century, arguing that living standards were just as high as in Britain, 
while Bayly (1983) has painted a picture of a thriving north Indian economy during 
the eighteenth century. Since the estimates of GDP are constructed from the output 
side, they also shed light on the extent to which India’s colonial experience was 
characterised by de-industrialisation as cotton textiles manufactured in Britain first 
displaced Indian exports in Britain before taking an increasing share of India’s other 
export markets and ultimately the Indian home market. 
 
This paper presents estimates of GDP for the pre-1871 period, and combines 
them with population data. We find that Indian per capita GDP declined steadily 
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries before stabilising during the 
nineteenth century. As British living standards increased from the mid-seventeenth 
century, India fell increasingly behind. Whereas in 1600, Indian per capita GDP was 
over 60 per cent of the British level, by 1871 it had fallen to less than 15 per cent. A 
number of conclusions follow. First, these estimates support the claims of Broadberry 
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and Gupta (2006), based on wage and price data, that the Great Divergence had 
already begun during the early modern period. Second, they are also consistent with a 
relatively prosperous India at the height of the Mughal Empire, although much of this 
prosperity had disappeared by the eighteenth century. Projecting back from 
Maddison’s (2010) estimates of GDP per capita for 1871 in 1990 international dollars, 
which are widely accepted as giving an accurate picture of living standards for the 
period after 1870, we arrive at a per capita income in 1600 of $682, well above the 
bare bones subsistence level of $400, or a little over a dollar a day. This is consistent 
with the recent revisionist work on Europe, which suggests that Maddison (2010) has 
substantially underestimated living standards in the pre-modern world (Broadberry et 
al., 2011). Third, the disaggregated results suggest that there was an absolute fall in 
Indian industrial production during the first three decades of the nineteenth century, 
rather than just a reduction in the share of industry in economic activity, although the 
scale of the fall was less than suggested by some nationalist authors (Bagchi, 1976). 
 
The historical national accounting methodology adopted in this paper 
combines all the major data series currently available for India during this period and 
builds in a number of cross-checks to ensure consistency. The major data series 
include wages, grain prices, cloth prices, agricultural and industrial exports, crop 
yields and cultivated acreage, cloth consumption per capita, urbanisation rates, and 
government revenue. Agricultural output is estimated from both the demand and 
supply sides, using information on wages and prices to estimate domestic demand and 
exports for foreign demand, and cross-checked over the long run by estimating 
agricultural supply using data on the cultivated acreage and crop yields. Industrial 
production for the domestic market is initially estimated also from information on 
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wage and prices, but it too is cross-checked against independent data on cloth 
consumption per capita from Roy (2012). These cross-checks verify the income 
elasticities of demand taken from the development literature, which suggests 
elasticities substantially below one. This means, in turn, that India’s per capita GDP 
falls significantly less than real consumption wages. Finally, the projection of 
comparative India/GB GDP per capita back in time from 1871 is cross-checked 
against another benchmark estimate for 1600, which ensures consistency between 
growth rates and levels of GDP per capita. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. We begin in Section II with a brief survey of 
the existing literature on India’s long run economic performance. This is followed in 
Section III by an application of the latest historical national accounting methods to 
India, describing the procedures for estimating output in agriculture, industry and 
services, before aggregating the sectoral outputs into real GDP for India during the 
period 1600-1871. In Section IV, these GDP estimates are then combined with data 
on population to derive estimates of Indian GDP per capita, and used to compare 
living standards in India and Britain. A new benchmark estimate of comparative GDP 
per capita in 1600 is also constructed, and used as a cross-check on the time series 
projections from the 1871 benchmark. Section V discusses the main results while 
section VI concludes. 
 
II. INDIA’S LONG RUN ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
India’s economic performance since the late sixteenth century has been the subject of 
enduring controversy. The travelogues of Europeans to India in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries often described great wealth and opulence, but it is not difficult 
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to see this as reflecting their contact with the ruling classes, who enjoyed a luxurious 
lifestyle with consumption of high quality food, clothing and ornaments, as well as 
imported luxury products. The middle class merchants and rich peasants that 
European travellers most frequently came into contact with also enjoyed a 
comfortable life-style. However, most travel accounts of Mughal India and the 
Deccan also noted that the majority of Indians lived in poverty (Chandra, 1982; 
Fukazawa, 1982). The labouring classes were seen as living in mud huts with thatched 
roofs, eating inferior grains, wearing rudimentary clothing and the use of footwear 
was relatively unknown (Moreland, 1923: 197-203). While cultural and climatic 
conditions may explain some of the consumption differences between India and 
Europe, most writers were in little doubt that the average Indian lived in poverty.  
 
1. Trends in Indian living standards 
There is a substantial literature which attempts to chart trends in Indian living 
standards over time, starting from 1595. The reign of Akbar is usually seen as the 
peak of economic well being, and is well documented in Abū ’l-Fazl’s [1595] Ā’ īn–i-
Akbarī, which meticulously reported wages and prices in the region of Agra.  This has 
provided a reference point for real wage comparisons with later years. Desai (1972) 
made the striking claim that at best, the average standard of living in 1961 was no 
higher than in 1595, when although a labourer could afford less industrial goods such 
as clothing, he could buy more food, with the changing relative prices reflecting the 
changing productivity trends in agriculture and industry. The paper provoked some 
controversy over the details of the calculations (Heston, 1977; Moosvi, 1977; Desai, 
1978). Nevertheless, most writers seem to accept the idea of a downward real wage 
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trend during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries before recovery during the 
twentieth century, a pattern first suggested by Mukerjee (1967).  
 
This view of late Mughal India as a relatively backward economy has been 
challenged recently by the work of revisionist economic historians, whose work must 
be assessed within the wider context of changing views on the Great Divergence of 
living standards between Asia and Europe. Parthasarathi’s (1998) characterisation of 
south Indian real wages as on a par with English real wages during the eighteenth 
century is strikingly at variance with the older literature, but fits well with the claims 
of Pomeranz (2000), Frank (1998) and other global historians that the most developed 
parts of Asia were on the same development level as the most developed parts of 
Europe such as Britain and the Netherlands as late as 1800. Bayly (1983) has painted 
a picture of a thriving market economy in north India during the eighteenth century, 
which leaves a similar impression. 
 
Broadberry and Gupta (2006) compare silver and grain wages in Britain with 
those in India and China during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which casts 
doubt on the revisionist position, suggesting that the Great Divergence was already 
under way during the early modern period. However, a full assessment, encompassing 
the ruling elites and middles classes as well as the labouring classes requires the 
reconstruction of national income in European and Asian countries. This paper makes 
a start on that process by deriving estimates of GDP and population in India between 
1600 and 1870, and comparing GDP per capita between India and Britain. This is the 
first time series of national income estimates for India before the late-nineteenth 
century, which can be seen as joining up with Heston’s (1983) estimates for the 
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period after 1870. Our comparative results are also broadly consistent with Roy’s 
(2010) point estimates of GDP per capita in Bengal and Britain around 1800. 
 
2. Did colonial India experience strong deindustrialisation? 
An enduring theme of the nationalist literature is that colonialism led to Indian 
deindustrialisation as Indian cotton textile exports were blocked from the protected 
British market and India was kept open to cheap imports from Britain (Dutt, 1956: 
256-269). It will be helpful in addressing this question to keep in mind Clingingsmith 
and Williamson’s (2008) distinction between strong and weak deindustrialisation. 
Whereas weak deindustrialisation requires merely a declining share of industry in 
overall economic activity, strong deindustrialisation requires an absolute fall in 
industrial output. The issue was first raised by Morris (1963: 613), who argued that 
the demand for cloth in India was elastic so that the supply shock of imported cloth 
from England increased quantities sold as well as reducing prices. With the demand 
curve for textiles in India also shifting out because of strong population growth, 
changes in custom and a shift away from inferior fabrics to cotton, the level of Indian 
cotton textile production stayed about the same with the increase in quantity 
accounted for largely by the imports. For Morris, then, colonial India was a case of 
weak rather than strong deindustrialisation. 
 
 Following hostile assessments of Morris’s argument by Chandra (1968) and 
Raychaudhuri (1968) on largely ideological grounds, Desai (1971) tried to assemble 
some data on imports and prices to infer the price elasticity of demand for cotton 
textiles, but was unable to draw firm conclusions without data on population and 
income. Bagchi (1976) also assembled empirical evidence to argue for the collapse of 
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Indian industry on a catastrophic scale, based on a study of Bihar where he claimed 
that the share of the occupied population in secondary activities declined from 18.6 
per cent in 1809/13 to just 8.5 per cent by 1901. However, Bagchi’s evidence was 
based on a comparison of two surveys that were not comparable, a selective survey 
conducted by Sir Francis Buchanan Hamilton for parts of Bihar and a later full census 
of the entire region (Vicziany, 1979; Robb, 1981: 512-513). In addition, it is likely 
that the scale of deindustrialisation was greater in Bihar than in India as a whole, on 
account of the high concentration of employment in cotton textiles in the Bengal 
region (Twomey, 1983: 49). 
 
Twomey (1983) improved upon the work of Desai (1971) by examining the 
data on Indian exports as well as imports and by making an allowance for income and 
domestic consumption, concluding that there was no absolute decline in output before 
1850, and only a modest decline between about 1850 and 1870, followed by recovery. 
However, Twomey’s data on the income variable covered only the period 1857-1900, 
while his data on domestic consumption started only in 1880, so his results are highly 
conjectural, particularly for the first half of the nineteenth century. Our approach 
within a national accounting framework provides a way of pinning down the key 
magnitudes and deriving the net effect on industrial output during the whole colonial 
period. 
 
III. ESTIMATING INDIAN NATIONAL INCOME 
In this section we derive estimates of Indian GDP by sector, following the latest 
methods of historical national accounting, incorporating demand effects into 
agriculture and urbanisation effects into services (Broadberry et al., 2011; 2014). The 
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starting point is the estimation of the population, which is used to derive the domestic 
demand for goods and services, as well as to provide the denominator for the series on 
GDP per capita. The growth of agricultural demand can be checked against the 
growth of the grain supply over the long run to provide the first of the key cross-
checks highlighted in the introduction. In the industrial sector, the growth of demand 
for cotton cloth can also be cross-checked against independent data on consumption 
of cloth per head of the population. Foreign trade data are also incorporated into 
output estimates of both the agricultural and industrial sectors. For the services sector, 
private services are assumed to grow in line with the urban population, while data on 
the size of the government are also incorporated.  
 
 The estimates that follow are for the territory of the Indian sub-continent, 
including Pakistan and Bangladesh as well as modern India, for the whole period 
1600-1871. In places, however, estimates are presented for the territory of the Mughal 
Empire and other sub-regions, particularly for cross-checking rates of change and per 
capita levels.  
 
1. Population 
The first full census of India was conducted non-synchronously between 1867 and 
1872, but is usually presented as the first decennial census for 1871. This provides the 
starting point of our population estimates in Table 1. For the period 1801-1871, we 
use the decadal estimates of Mahalanobis and Bhattacharya (1976), who assembled 
information collected by the British for the three Presidencies of Bengal, Madras and 
Bombay, and supplemented this with assumptions about the rate of population growth 
in the non-enumerated regions. For earlier years, we have drawn on the estimates 
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collected together by Visaria and Visaria (1983: 466), based on a 50-year frequency. 
We use the Bhattacharya estimates for 1751-1801, the mean Datta estimates to link 
1600 and 1750, the Wilcox estimates to link 1600 with 1650, and log-linear 
interpolation for 1700. These estimates are based on evidence that is mostly regional, 
incomplete and subject to differing territorial coverage. 
 
Given the hybrid nature of the series projected back from the 1871 benchmark, 
it is worth noting that Habib (1982a: 164-166) provides a useful cross-check for the 
absolute population level in 1600, on the basis of three alternative methods of 
estimation, derived from the wealth of data in Abū ’l-Fazl [1595]. This methodology 
of providing cross checks on the consistency of levels and growth rate information 
will be applied also to the GDP per capita data. For population in 1600, one approach, 
based on the cultivated area, yields an estimate of 142 million, while an alternative 
approach based on land revenue suggests a population of 144.3 million. A third 
method, based on the size of armies, suggests a population of 140 to 150 million. All 
three estimates are broadly consistent with our population figure of 142 million in 
1600. Although Guha (2001: 64) points out that Habib’s methodology assumes that 
the share of the population in the north was the same in 1600 as during the nineteenth 
century, he is unable to provide any reliable evidence to the contrary. Habib’s 
estimates are therefore preferred here.  
 
Indian population grew at an annual rate of 0.22 per cent over the whole 
period 1600-1871. However, growth was faster in the nineteenth century than during 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The effect of famines is easier to identify in 
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the nineteenth century because of the higher frequency of observations, but crises 
were equally prevalent in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
 
2. Agricultural output: demand and supply-based estimates 
Agricultural output is derived from the demand for food, with an allowance for 
foreign trade, and this is cross-checked against the long run growth of supply. The 
demand approach builds on the work of Crafts (1976), who criticised Deane and 
Cole’s (1967) early work on eighteenth century Britain, which assumed constant per 
capita corn consumption while real incomes were rising and the relative price of corn 
was changing. Crafts (1985) recalculated the path of agricultural output in Britain 
with income and price elasticities derived from the experience of later developing 
countries. The approach was developed further by Allen (2000) using consumer 
theory. Allen (2000: 13-14) starts with the identity: 
rcNQ A           (1) 
where Q
A
 is real agricultural output, r is the ratio of production to consumption, c is 
consumption per head and N is population. Real agricultural consumption per head is 
assumed to be a function of its own price in real terms (P
A
/P), the price of non-
agricultural goods and services in real terms (P
NA
/P), and real income per head (y). 
Assuming a log-linear specification, we have: 
 yPPPPc NAA ln)/ln()/ln(ln 210       (2) 
where α1 and α2 are the own-price and cross-price elasticities of demand, β is the 
income elasticity of demand and α0 is a constant. Consumer theory requires that the 
own-price, cross-price and income elasticities should sum to zero, which sets tight 
constraints on the plausible values, particularly given the accumulated evidence on 
elasticities in developing countries (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980: 15-16, 60-82). 
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 For early modern Europe, Allen (2000: 14) works with an own-price elasticity 
of -0.6 and a cross-price elasticity of 0.1, which constrains the income elasticity to be 
0.5. Allen also assumes that agricultural consumption is equal to agricultural 
production. For the case of India, where more limited information is available, we 
implement a more limited version using the grain wage (the daily wage divided by the 
price of grain) and an assumed income elasticity of 0.4. One way to justify this would 
be if the cross-price elasticity is zero and real income is the wage divided by the 
overall price level. The own-price elasticity must then equal the negative of the real 
wage elasticity. But then the overall price level used to deflate the wage cancels out 
with the overall price level used to deflate the grain price, leaving a single term in the 
grain wage. The slightly lower income elasticity of 0.4 is consistent with estimates for 
staple grains in poor societies (Bouis, 1994). 
 
The implementation of the demand approach requires data on wages and 
prices as well as the population estimates from Table 1. Table 2 sets out an index of 
wages for unskilled labourers in India, together with indices of grain and cloth prices. 
The wage and grain price series are derived from Broadberry and Gupta (2006) for the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, supplemented by additional information for the 
nineteenth century from Mukerjee (1967), and provide the most widely used index of 
real wages in India, the grain wage. Although the precise magnitude of the fall in the 
grain wage from its high level in the early seventeenth century is a matter of 
controversy, most scholars have acknowledged the downward trend (Desai, 1972; 
1978; Moosvi, 1973; 1977; Heston, 1977). It is interesting to note that the scale of the 
Indian grain wage decline is similar to that suggested by van Zanden (1999) and Allen 
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(2001) for early modern southern and eastern Europe, where a long period of decline 
steadily eroded the post-Black Death doubling of real wages. Furthermore, Allen 
(2007) shows that these Indian wages were still just about sufficient to provide the 
roughly 2,000 kilocalories per person needed for survival and reproduction at their 
low point in the early nineteenth century. 
 
 The cloth price series is derived from the records of the East India Company 
for the period before 1833 and from Parliamentary Papers for subsequent years 
(Chaudhuri, 1978; Bowen, 2007; Twomey, 1983; Sandberg, 1974). Note that the cloth 
wage declined by less than the grain wage during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries and increased substantially during the nineteenth century as the price of 
cloth declined relative to the price of grain. As a result, the real consumption wage 
declined by much less than the grain wage, which has often been taken as an easily 
available index of living standards. Our real consumption wage is a weighted average 
of the grain wage and the cloth wage, with a weight of two-thirds given to the former, 
consistent with budget studies for India during this period (Allen, 2009). 
 
 An index of agricultural production for the domestic market is provided in 
Table 3A, derived from the grain wage with the income elasticity of demand set at 
0.4, consistent with the work of Bouis (1994) on staple grains in poor societies. 
Although there must inevitably be some degree of uncertainty about the precise value 
of the income elasticity of demand, we do not think that any plausible value could 
have a very large effect on our results. Malanima (2011) has also worked with a value 
of 0.4 for Italy over the period 1300-1913, while Allen’s (2000) influential study of 
early modern Europe worked with a value of 0.5. The lowest value that we have 
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found for the income elasticity of demand for food as a whole is 0.3 in the study by 
Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Escosura (2013) of the rise and fall of Spain. In the 
context of modern India, Sivasubramanian and Deaton (1996) report a range of 0.3 to 
0.5 for the income elasticity of demand for food. Working with this range has only a 
small effect on the scale of the decline of agricultural output per head.
1
 We prefer the 
value of 0.4 for the income elasticity because, as we demonstrate below in Table 4, 
this is consistent with the growth of supply over the long run, derived from 
information on the cultivated land area and crop yields. Although there is a literature 
which claims to have found a lower value than 0.3 for the income elasticity of demand 
for food in modern India, Deaton and Drèze (2002; 2009) convincingly argue that this 
arises from a combination of working in terms of the demand for calories and shifting 
demand for different types of food as a result of changes in the level of physical 
activity and the health environment. During the period under study here, between 
1600 and 1871, the growth of demand caused by population expansion was tempered 
by the declining grain wage, so that total agricultural consumption increased more 
slowly than population. This is consistent with a Malthusian picture of diminishing 
returns in food production, as less fertile land was brought into cultivation.  
 
 Turning to the impact of foreign trade, however, we see that the diminishing 
returns in food production were offset in the nineteenth century by the expansion of 
non-food agricultural crops. Table 3B provides an index of agricultural exports, 
derived by obtaining the value of total exports in current prices and the share of 
agricultural crops from Chaudhuri (1983), and deflating the resulting series of 
                                                 
1
 With an income elasticity of demand of 0.4 in Table 3A, per capita consumption drops from 133.5 in 
1600 to 100.0 in 1871. With an income elasticity of 0.3, the decline would be from 124.2 to 100.0, 
while with an income elasticity of 0.5 it would be from 143.5 to 100.0. 
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agricultural exports in current prices by the agricultural price index from Mukerjee 
(1967). For the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, we have assumed that 
agricultural exports grew in line with domestic agricultural production. Weights for 
the export and domestic components of agricultural production in 1871 are obtained 
by projecting the share of exports in total production in 1901 back in time. Although 
the share of exports in total agricultural production in 1871 was only around 10 per 
cent, agricultural exports nevertheless had a significant impact on the path of total 
agricultural production in the nineteenth century, as exports of crops such as raw 
cotton, opium and indigo offset the diminishing returns in food production. As we 
shall see in the next section, the export of these non-food crops also offset a 
substantial decline in exports of cotton piece goods, as India’s comparative advantage 
shifted away from manufactures. 
 
 It is important to cross check the agricultural demand series with the 
availability of output estimated from the supply side. For the case of India, it is not 
possible to estimate directly on a high-frequency basis an output-based series for 
agriculture such as that provided by Broadberry et al., (2011) for Britain, or Bassino 
et al., (2012) for Japan. However, it is possible to reconstruct the acreage and yields 
of all the main crops in 1600 and 1910, to cross-check the long run increase in output. 
First, note that in the demand-based approach of Table 3, agricultural output increased 
between 1600 and 1871 from 67.8 to 100.0, or by a factor of 1.475. This can then be 
extended to 1910 using the agricultural output series from Heston (1983), as in 
Broadberry and Gupta (2010), which increased by a factor of 1.51 between 1871 and 
1910. This implies an increase of agricultural output between 1600 and 1910 by a 
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factor of 2.23. This can be compared with the increase in output derived from data on 
the cultivated acreage and the yields of the main crops in 1600 and 1910.  
 
In Table 4A, the cultivated area from Moosvi (1987) has been presented in 
terms of acres, converted from the original data in bigha. The calculations are based 
on Moosvi’s careful reconstruction of the acreage in 1600 and 1910 for the United 
Provinces, Gujarat and the Punjab, the agricultural heartland of the Mughal Empire. 
Moosvi demonstrates a more than doubling of the acreage between 1600 and 1910. 
Table 4B provides data on the yields of the ten main crops between 1600 and 1910, 
taken largely from Moosvi (1987) and Department of Revenue and Agriculture 
(1912). In addition, data on rice yields for 1600 are taken from Abū ’l-Fazl [1595], 
while cotton yields are taken from Moosvi (1987: 82) and refer to 1545-1595 and the 
1870s, as the figures for 1910 from Department of Revenue and Agriculture (1912) 
are available only for cleaned cotton. Although there has been a suggestion by Blyn 
(1966) of a downward trend in yields during the twentieth century, Moosvi’s (1987) 
data suggest broadly stable yields between 1600 and 1910. Scattered regional data on 
yields in 1830 and 1870 from Guha (1992: 46) are also consistent with this pattern. 
Table 4C derives the increase in output as the product of the substantial increase in 
acreage and the barely discernible increase in the weighted yield, which suggests an 
approximate doubling of output as well as acreage. This increase in output by a factor 
of 2.28 is very close to the increase by a factor of 2.23 obtained using the demand 
approach. The calculation is restricted to only a part of the Mughal Empire, but the 
agreement between the two approaches is reassuring. 
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 A further cross-check on the agricultural output growth estimates of Table 3 is 
provided by the work of Clingingsmith and Williamson (2008: 215-216) on the 
frequency of drought years in India between 1525 and 1900. The incidence of drought 
years was unusually low between 1650 and 1800, and unusually high during the first 
quarter of the nineteenth century. This corresponds with our findings of output growth 
between 1650 and 1800 and declining output during the early nineteenth century.  
 
3. Industrial Output 
Table 5 sets out the data for estimating the output of industry oriented towards the 
home market. As with agriculture, we have used a demand function approach, which 
can be cross-checked against other estimates of per capita cloth consumption 
available for the nineteenth century. We have allowed cloth consumption per capita to 
move in line with the cloth wage from Table 2 and an assumed income elasticity of 
demand of 0.5. The absolute level of cloth consumption per capita in the base year of 
1871 has been set at 8.2 square yards from Roy (2012). Roy also provides estimates 
of cloth consumption per capita for a number of other years, and our figure of 0.5 for 
the income elasticity of demand has been chosen to be consistent with these 
estimates.
2
 We find per capita consumption of cloth fell between 1600 and 1811 as 
wages failed to keep up with rising cloth prices. However, after 1811 the price of 
cloth fell sharply while money wages continued to increase. Per capita cloth 
consumption then increased with the rising cloth wage.  
 
                                                 
2
 Roy (2012) reports figures of 8.0 square yards for 1860, 5.7 square yards for 1840, 5.1 square yards 
for 1820 and 5.2 to 6.7 square yards for 1795. 
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Nevertheless, domestic production did not move simply in line with 
consumption after 1801 because of the growing penetration of the Indian home 
market by imports from Britain, shown in Table 5B. In line with Roy (2012), we find 
that the growing import penetration was consistent with a slight upward trend in 
domestic production for the home market, because of population growth.  
 
 To derive a series for overall industrial output, we need to quantify 
developments in the export section of Indian industry to add to our estimates of 
production for the domestic market. Table 6 provides data on Indian textile exports to 
Britain for the period 1665-1834 from Chaudhuri (1978) and Bowen (2007). Although 
we lack data for Indian exports to other countries, it is possible to make an allowance 
for the growing share of Britain as an export destination using data on regional shares 
of bullion inflows to India from Haider (1996: 323), Table 6 capture the healthy state 
of the Indian cotton textile export industry during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. After 1801, however, the industry went into decline, particularly with the 
growing British competition after the end of the Napoleonic Wars (Broadberry and 
Gupta, 2009). Table 7 charts the continued decline of the Indian textile export 
industry until the establishment of a modern factory based industry in Bombay during 
the 1850s (Morris, 1983: 572-583; Farnie, 2004: 400-405). The current price data for 
the period 1851-1871 have been converted to constant prices using an index of 
imported cotton cloth prices from Sandberg (1974: 260), which tracks well the price 
of domestically produced cloth for overlapping years from Mitra (1978: 207). During 
this period, the price of cloth rose by just 6.3 per cent, so the deflation makes only a 
small difference to the nominal data. 
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 Cotton cloth was overwhelmingly India’s main industrial export, and there are 
no consistent data series for other industrial exports. Nevertheless, for the period after 
1757, Chaudhuri (1983) has reconstructed the Indian balance of payments, and finds 
that non-agricultural exports were driven by cotton textiles. As noted in section III.2, 
the collapse of Indian cotton textile exports in the nineteenth century was offset by an 
increase in agricultural exports rather than other industrial exports.  
 
4. The service sector 
For domestic services and housing, Deane and Cole (1967) assumed output growth in 
line with population. However, recent work on the long run development of the 
European economy suggests that service sector output growth moves more closely in 
line with the urban population (Broadberry et al., 2011). This approach began with 
Wrigley (1985), and has recently been combined with the demand approach to 
agriculture to provide indirect estimates of GDP in a number of European countries 
during the early modern period (Malanima, 2011; Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de la 
Escosura, 2013). With the path of agricultural output (qa) derived using equations (1) 
and (2), overall output (q) is derived as: 
 
 qq
q
q
na
a
/1
        (3) 
where the share of non-agricultural output in total output (qna/q) is proxied by the 
urbanisation rate. Here, the approach is made less crude by providing independent 
estimates for industry and government services, thus using the urban population to 
track only private services and housing. 
 
Estimates of the urban share of the population in India are presented in Table 8 
for benchmark years, suggesting a decline in the share of the population living in 
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cities of more than 5,000 inhabitants. Multiplying the population by the urban share, 
with interpolation between benchmark years, yields an estimate of the urban 
population, which remained fairly stable despite the growing total population. Note 
that this does not necessarily imply differential population growth amongst different 
castes, since the link between caste and occupation was not as rigid as is sometimes 
assumed, particularly before codification by British administrators during the late 
colonial period (Cohn, 1996). Indeed, although some caste-based occupations such as 
cleaning and working at funeral pyres are rigid, other castes have historically self-
selected into more than one occupation. Furthermore, there is no simple mapping 
between occupational and industrial classifications, with some occupations such as 
labourer able to work in agriculture, industry or services. 
 
 For government services, Deane and Cole (1967) used current expenditure on 
government services from the budgetary accounts deflated by a price index. In the 
case of India, we can only measure the size of the government sector from the revenue 
side, but it is reasonable to assume that government expenditure moved broadly in 
line with revenue at least over the periods of time between the observations 
considered here (half centuries during the Mughal period and decades during the 
British period). Current price revenues are assembled from the sources listed in the 
notes to Table 9 and deflated using the weighted average of the grain price and cloth 
price indices presented in Table 2. Since the territory from which the revenue was 
collected varies, we have converted the revenues to a constant territorial basis by 
using real revenue per square mile as our indicator of the size of the government 
sector. Real government revenue per square mile in Table 9 declined during the first 
half of the seventeenth century from its peak level at the time of Akbar. After a 
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revival in the second half of the seventeenth century under Auranzeb, revenue 
declined again as the Mughal Empire collapsed during the first half of the eighteenth 
century. Revenue increased again under British rule from 1757, but surpassed the 
peak revenue at the time of Akbar only during the mid-nineteenth century. Note that 
the real revenue per square mile was at its low point in the mid-eighteenth century 
whether viewed from the declining Mughal perspective in 1750 or the rising British 
perspective in 1766. Since the government sector was only a small part of GDP, it 
was not a key driver of the overall level of output or GDP per capita. 
 
5. Sectoral shares 
To aggregate the time series for output in each of the major sectors into a total real 
output index, we require value added weights. The earliest sectoral value added 
weights for India are for 1900/01 from the work of Sivasubramonian (2000). 
However, these can be projected back to circa 1871 using changes in employment 
structure, following the procedure used by Hoffmann (1965: 389) for Germany. 
Essentially, this involves assuming that the sectoral distribution of value added per 
employee in 1900/01 acts as a good indicator of the sectoral distribution of value 
added per employee in 1871.  
 
The sectoral weights for India circa 1871 are set out in Table 10. The largest 
sector was agriculture, and industry was largely geared towards the domestic market. 
Commerce accounted for 5.5 per cent of GDP, but is combined here with industry. 
Government, domestic services and housing together accounted for the remaining 
10.3 per cent of GDP. It is important to realise that the use of 1871 weights does not 
imply that sectoral output shares are assumed to have remained constant from 1600 
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until 1871. For example, since export industries grew much faster than other sectors 
between 1600 and 1801, and then declined sharply while other sectors continued to 
grow, the share of export industries in total output first increased from 1.4 per cent in 
1600 to 3.7 per cent in 1801 before falling back to 0.7 per cent by 1871. The index 
number theory underlying this issue is discussed in Crafts and Harley (1992: 706-7, 
722). As will be apparent, his makes the export industries sector large enough for its 
decline to bring about deindustrilaisation, but not large enough to be a key driver of 
GDP per capita, which is driven largely by agriculture and home industries. Indeed, 
export industries were booming during the period of declining GDP per capita, and 
collapsed just at the time that GDP per capita stabilised. 
 
6. Total real output 
Table 11 sets out the time series for all the major sectors and the aggregate output or 
gross domestic product (GDP) index obtained using the 1871 sectoral weights from 
Table 10. Industry and commerce grew rapidly between 1650 and 1801, driven 
particularly by exports. Agriculture also expanded, but less rapidly. Since agriculture 
was the largest sector, the growth of total output was also quite modest before 1801. 
Total output stagnated between 1801 and 1841 as modest agricultural growth was 
offset by deindustrialisation. There was a return to modest total output growth 
between 1841 and 1871 as industrial growth returned and agricultural growth 
accelerated.  
 
IV. PER CAPITA GDP 
1. Time series projections 
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The GDP series from Table 11 can be combined with the population data from Table 
1 to establish in Table 12 the path of GDP per capita in India. Per capita GDP 
declined during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries before stabilising during the 
nineteenth century. Table 13 puts India’s per capita GDP performance in an 
international comparative perspective. Benchmarking on the comparative India/GB 
per capita GDP level for 1871 from Broadberry and Gupta (2010), we see that India’s 
comparative position deteriorated from a GDP per capita of more than 60 per cent of 
the British level in 1600 to just 14.5 per cent by 1871. The relative decline occurred 
fairly steadily throughout the period. 
 
 Table 14 converts the GDP per capita information in index number form from 
Table 13 into absolute levels of 1990 international dollars, as has become standard in 
historical national accounting since the work of Maddison (1995). This enables us to 
gauge how far above bare bones subsistence India was. The World Bank’s “dollar-a-
day” definition of poverty suggests a per capita income level of around $400 as a 
minimum, and Maddison (1995) finds a number of third world countries at this level 
in the modern world. Note, however, that Mughal India was well above this level. 
Although some decline had occurred by the mid-eighteenth century, it was only 
during the early nineteenth century that Indian per capita incomes fell close to bare 
bones subsistence. 
 
2. A cross sectional benchmark check 
The results in Tables 13 and 14 are based on time series projections from a 
benchmark estimate of comparative GDP per capita levels in 1871. This potentially 
raises serious index number problems, so it is helpful to calculate an additional 
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benchmark estimate for comparative GDP per capita levels in 1600 to check for 
consistency with the levels suggested by the time series projections. Although Prados 
de la Escosura (2000) and Ward and Devereux (2003) claim that these index number 
problems are serious enough to call into question the whole validity of the time series 
projection methodology, Broadberry (1998; 2003; 2006) finds broad consistency 
between time series projections and direct benchmarks in a number of detailed case 
studies during the period since the mid-nineteenth century. This is the first study to 
extend this methodology back to the early modern period, enabling us to confirm 
Broadberry’s (2006) pragmatic conclusion that although index number problems 
exist, with careful treatment of the data it is still possible to bring time series 
projections and direct benchmarks together to tell a consistent story. 
 
 Nominal GDP data for the Mughal Empire circa 1600 have been constructed 
by Moosvi (2008), built up on a sectoral basis. The total GDP of 22,387 million dams 
has been converted to rupees and divided  by the population, obtained by applying 
Moreland’s [1923] ratio of 60 per cent of the total Indian population to Habib’s 
(1982a) figure of 142 million, used here in Table 1. Dividing nominal GDP by 
population results in a figure of Rs 6.57 for GDP per capita in Mughal India. Nominal 
GDP and population data for England are taken from Broadberry et al., (2011), 
yielding a GDP per capita figure of £5.66. Comparing the Mughal and English GDP 
per capita figures at the silver exchange rate  of £1 = Rs 8 yields an Indian per capita 
GDP figure in 1600 that was just 14.5 per cent of the English level. This is broadly in 
line with Broadberry and Gupta’s (2006) result that the Indian silver wage was just 21 
per cent of the English level at the end of the sixteenth century.  
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However, Broadberry and Gupta (2006) also noted that at the same time, the 
Indian grain wage was 83 per cent of the English level. Comparing the price of wheat 
in India with the price of wheat in England yields a purchasing power parity (PPP) of 
£1 = Rs 1.63, a long way from the silver exchange rate. Using the wheat price PPP 
rather than the silver exchange to compare Indian and English per capita incomes 
yields a much smaller difference, with Indian GDP per capita now 71.2 per cent of the 
English level. This is much closer to the time series projection in Table 13, where 
Indian GDP per capita was 61.5 per cent of the British level. Allowing for differences 
in territorial units (Mughal Empire versus India and England versus Great Britain) and 
smaller deviations from PPP for other prices suggests a broad consistency between the 
time series projections and the 1600 benchmark. 
 
V. DISCUSSION OF THE MAIN FINDINGS 
1. When did the Great Divergence begin? 
Our results have important implications for the debate over the timing of the Great 
Divergence. Parthasarathi (1998) uses a comparative real wage study of Britain and 
India to support the “California School” view that living standards in the most 
developed parts of Asia were on a par with the most developed parts of Europe as late 
as the end of the eighteenth century (Frank, 1998; Pomeranz, 2000). The evidence 
presented in Table 13, however, suggests that Indian living standards were already 
substantially below the British level during the seventeenth century.  
 
This supports the view of Broadberry and Gupta (2006), based on silver wage 
and grain wage data, that the Great Divergence was already well underway during the 
early modern period. Figure 1 plots Indian per capita GDP as a percentage of British 
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per capita GDP, together with the data on comparative per capita incomes as 
measured by the grain wage and the silver wage. Broadberry and Gupta (2006) argued 
on theoretical grounds that the grain wage provides an upper bound on India’s 
comparative position, while the silver wage provides a lower bound. Figure 1 shows 
that indeed, taking account of the whole range of economic activities, the GDP per 
capita data lie between these two bounds. 
 
2. Was India always poor? 
Maddison’s (2010) data, plotted in Figure 2 suggest that India was always very poor, 
with a per capita GDP of just $550 in 1990 prices in the year 1500, dropping to $533 
in the early nineteenth century. Our data in Table 14, also plotted in Figure 2 for 
comparison, suggest a substantially higher GDP per capita in 1600, of the order of 
$700. Although this suggests a prosperous India at the height of the Mughal Empire 
during the time of Akbar, much of this prosperity had disappeared by the eighteenth 
century. However, with per capita incomes of more than $600, India was still 
sufficiently prosperous in the early eighteenth century to be consistent with the scale 
of market activity described by Bayly (1983). It is only by the beginning of the 
nineteenth century that most Indians were reduced to what Allen (2009) calls “bare 
bones” subsistence. 
 
3. Did colonial India experience strong deindustrialisation? 
We have already noted that there was a small upward trend in domestic industrial 
production for the home market, which might be interpreted as offering support for 
the position of Morris (1963), who argued that import penetration of cotton textiles 
from Lancashire did not lead to the absolute decline of the traditional Indian cotton 
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textile sector because of increasing demand as a result of positive population growth 
and the falling price of imported cotton textiles. However, in assessing the issue of 
deindustrialisation, we have to balance a sharp absolute decline in exports against a 
small upward trend in domestic output. Despite the relatively small weight of the 
export section by 1871, the scale of the decline was so catastrophic that the net effect 
was an absolute decline in Indian industrial production in the first three decades of the 
nineteenth century, rather than just a reduction in the share of industry in economic 
activity.  
 
Our findings therefore suggest that colonial India experienced strong 
deindustrialisation during the early nineteenth century, not just weak 
deindustrialisation. Nevertheless, the scale of Indian deindustrialisation shown here is 
more modest than the catastrophic domestic industrial collapse claimed by Bagchi 
(1976). Although Twomey (1983) also suggests a modest absolute decline of 
industrial output on the basis of trends in cotton textiles, the timing of the decline is 
rather different from that suggested here. Despite his lack of income data before 1857, 
Twomey (1983: 53) speculates that output was stable between 1800 and 1850, then 
declined to the 1870s. By contrast, the estimates presented here suggest an absolute 
decline during the first three decades of the nineteenth century, followed by recovery 
to the 1870s. 
 
VI. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
This paper provides estimates of Indian GDP constructed from the output side for the 
pre-1871 period, and combines them with population estimates to track the path of 
living standards. Indian per capita GDP declined steadily during the seventeenth and 
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eighteenth centuries before stabilising during the nineteenth century. As British living 
standards increased from the mid-seventeenth century, India fell increasingly behind. 
Whereas in 1600, Indian per capita GDP was over 60 per cent of the British level, by 
1871 it had fallen to less than 15 per cent. 
 
Relative to the existing literature, we make the following contributions. First, 
our estimates cast further doubt on the recent revisionist work which seeks to date the 
origins of the Great Divergence of living standards between Europe and Asia only 
after the Industrial Revolution (Frank, 1998; Parthasarathi, 1998; Pomeranz, 2000). 
The GDP per capita data show for the whole economy, not just the wage-earning class 
surveyed by Broadberry and Gupta (2006), that the Great Divergence had already 
begun during the early modern period. Second, these data are also consistent with a 
relatively prosperous India at the height of the Mughal Empire, as suggested by Bayly 
(1983), although much of this prosperity had disappeared by the eighteenth century. 
Nevertheless, India did not sink close to the bare bones subsistence level of living 
standards before the early nineteenth century. Third, however, the new estimates do 
suggest that India experienced an absolute decline of industrial output during the first 
three decades of the twentieth century, rather than just a declining share of industry in 
economic activity. This is contrary to the suggestion of Morris (1963), but the modest 
scale of the absolute decline is also inconsistent with Bagchi’s (1976) claim of a 
catastrophic collapse of industrial employment. 
 
 This paper has set out to document what happened, and explaining these 
developments is clearly the subject of another paper. Nevertheless, it is worth making 
some final concluding comments in this area. First, India shared the pattern of 
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declining GDP per capita during this period with China, although the decline started 
from a higher level and occurred at a faster rate in China (Broadberry, Guan and Li, 
2014). Second, in India, as in China, the decline was driven mainly by what happened 
in agriculture, with the growth of population outstripping the growth of the cultivated 
area, and crop yields rising insufficiently to offset the decline in cultivated acreage per 
head. Third, in common with most of the world at this time, and in strong contrast to 
Britain and Holland, Indian workers remained on the land, with negative 
consequences for agricultural labour productivity and the relative size of the industrial 
and service sectors. Fourth, again in common with much of the rest of the world at 
this time, India lacked the state institutions needed to underpin the investment and 
innovation which allowed Britain and Holland to break out of the Malthusian trap, 
allowing both population and per capita incomes to increase (Parthasarathi, 2011; 
Broadberry, 2013). Fifth, although India’s decline continued during the colonial 
period, it had already started during the Mughal Empire, and so cannot be attributed 
solely to colonialism. This conclusion is reinforced by the more rapid decline of 
China. 
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TABLE 1: Indian population, 1600-1871 
 
Year Population 
level 
(millions) 
 Period Annual 
growth rate 
(%) 
1600 142  1600-1650 0.00 
1650 142  1650-1700 0.29 
1700 164  1700-1750 0.29 
1750 190  1750-1801 0.17 
1801 207  1801-1811 0.38 
1811 215  1811-1821 -0.48 
1821 205  1821-1831 0.52 
1831 216  1831-1841 -0.19 
1841 212  1841-1851 0.91 
1851 232  1851-1861 0.51 
1861 244  1861-1871 0.48 
1871 256    
   1600-1801 0.19 
   1801-1871 0.30 
   1600-1871 0.22 
 
Sources: Mahalanobis and Bhattacharya (1976: 7); Visaria and Visaria (1983: 466). 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2: Real wages of Indian unskilled labourers, 1600-1871 (1871=100) 
 
Year Wage Grain 
price 
Cloth 
price 
Grain 
wage 
Cloth 
wage 
Real 
consumption 
wage 
1600 37.7 18.3 57.1 205.9 65.9 159.7 
1650 72.3 40.9 127.6 176.8 56.7 137.2 
1700 78.3 46.6 150.6 168.1 52.0 129.8 
1750 83.5 61.4 168.3 136.0 49.6 107.5 
1801 80.3 67.6 166.7 118.9 48.2 95.5 
1811 68.1 70.4 182.6 96.7 37.3 77.1 
1821 69.9 67.9 180.4 103.0 38.7 81.8 
1831 71.1 73.1 171.8 97.3 41.4 78.8 
1841 72.3 61.3 110.3 117.9 65.5 100.7 
1851 72.9 63.3 89.0 115.1 81.9 104.1 
1861 98.8 105.6 100.0 93.6 98.8 95.3 
1871 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Sources: Broadberry and Gupta (2006: 14); Mukerjee (1967: 58); Chaudhuri (1978); 
Bowen (2007); Twomey (1983); Sandberg (1974). 
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TABLE 3: Indian agricultural output, 1600-1871 (1871=100) 
 
A. Agricultural consumption  
Year Population Grain 
wage 
Consumption 
per capita 
Total 
consumption 
1600 55.5 205.9 133.5 74.0 
1650 55.5 176.8 125.6 69.7 
1700 64.1 168.1 123.1 78.9 
1750 74.2 136.0 113.1 83.9 
1801 80.9 118.9 107.2 86.6 
1811 84.0 96.7 98.7 82.9 
1821 80.1 103.0 101.2 81.0 
1831 84.4 97.3 98.9 83.4 
1841 82.8 117.9 106.8 88.5 
1851 90.6 115.1 105.8 95.9 
1861 95.3 93.6 97.4 92.8 
1871 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
B. Agricultural exports and total production 
Year Agricultual 
exports 
Agricultural 
production for 
domestic market 
Total 
agricultural 
production 
1600 11.2 74.0 67.8 
1650 10.5 69.7 63.8 
1700 11.9 78.9 72.2 
1750 12.7 83.9 76.8 
1801 13.3 86.6 79.3 
1811 14.0 82.9 76.0 
1821 19.8 81.0 74.9 
1831 23.7 83.4 77.5 
1841 32.0 88.5 82.8 
1851 51.8 95.9 91.5 
1861 56.4 92.8 89.2 
1871 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Sources and notes: Domestic agricultural production: derived from Tables 1 and 2, 
with the income elasticity of demand set at 0.4. Agricultural exports in current prices: 
Chaudhuri (1983: 828-837, 842-844), converted to constant prices using the grain 
price index from Table 2. Before 1801, agricultural exports are assumed to grow in 
line with domestic production. Share of agricultural exports in agricultural production 
in 1901 from Sivasubramonian (2000) projected back to 1871. 
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TABLE 4: A cross-check on the increase in agricultural output, territory of the 
Mughal Empire, 1600-1910 
 
A. Cultivated acreage 
 1600 1910 Ratio, 
1910/1600 
United Provinces 23,257,064 44,018,258 1.89 
Gujarat 7,854,145 13,553,827 1.72 
Punjab 18,483,618 47,173,912 2.55 
Total 49,594,827 104,745,997 2.11 
 
B. Crop yields (lb per acre) 
 1600 1870 1910 Ratio, 
1910/1600 
1910 
weights 
Wheat 1,242 1,295 1,250 1.01 21.2 
Barley 1,191 1,321 1,300 1.09 16.8 
Rice 1,064 1,053 1,053 0.99 19.8 
Jowar 697 711 650 0.93 8.3 
Bajra 462 692 550 1.19 8.4 
Gram 894 945 950 1.06 16.1 
Sesame 368 227 280 0.76 1.6 
Rape and mustard 472 665 600 1.27 0.6 
Sugarcane 1,082 1,755 2,600 2.40 3.3 
Cotton 472 469 469 0.99 3.9 
Unweighted average    1.16  
Weighted average    1.08  
 
C. Change in agricultural output 
 Ratio, 1910/1600 
Acreage 2.11 
Yield 1.08 
Output 2.28 
  
Demand 2.23 
 
Sources and notes: Acreage: Moosvi (1987: 65); Crop yields: rice 1600: Abū ’l-Fazl 
(1993, vol.II: 70), cotton 1600 and 1870/1910 Moosvi (1987: 82); all other crop 
yields: 1600: Moosvi (1987: 80); 1910: Department of Revenue and Agriculture 
(1912: 386); weights 1910: Department of Revenue and Agriculture (1912: 120-127); 
Change in agricultural output derived as the product of the changes in acreage and 
yield. Measurement conversions: 1 bigha = 0.67 acres; 1 man = 55 lb in 1600 and 47 
lb in 1870 and 1910. 
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TABLE 5: Cotton textile production for the domestic Indian market 
 
A. Cloth consumption 
Year Population 
(millions) 
Cloth wage 
(1871=100) 
Cloth 
consumption 
per capita 
(1871=100) 
Cloth 
consumption 
per capita 
(sq yds) 
Cloth 
consumption 
(m yds) 
1600 142 65.9 81.2 6.7 946 
1650 142 56.7 75.3 6.2 876 
1700 164 52.0 72.1 5.9 970 
1750 190 49.6 70.5 5.8 1,098 
1801 207 48.2 69.4 5.7 1,178 
1811 215 37.3 61.1 5.0 1,076 
1821 205 38.7 62.2 5.1 1,046 
1831 216 41.4 64.3 5.3 1,139 
1841 212 65.5 81.0 6.6 1,407 
1851 232 81.9 90.5 7.4 1,722 
1861 244 98.8 99.4 8.2 1,989 
1871 256 100.0 100.0 8.2 2,099 
 
B. Imports and domestic production 
Year Cotton 
consumption 
(m yds) 
Imports 
from Britain 
(m yds) 
Domestic 
production 
(m yds) 
Domestic 
production 
(1871=100) 
1600 946 0 946 72.4 
1650 876 0 876 67.1 
1700 970 0 970 74.3 
1750 1,098 0 1,098 84.0 
1801 1,178 0 1,178 90.2 
1811 1,076 1 1,075 82.3 
1821 1,046 20 1,026 78.6 
1831 1,139 38 1,101 84.3 
1841 1,407 141 1,266 97.0 
1851 1,722 348 1,374 105.2 
1861 1,989 514 1,475 112.9 
1871 2,099 793 1,306 100.0 
 
Sources: Population: Table 1. Cotton consumption per head in 1871 from Roy (2012) 
and projected to other years with the cloth wage and an income elasticity of demand 
assumed to be 0.5. This produces estimates of per capita cloth consumption in other 
years broadly in line with the estimates surveyed in Roy (2012). Imports from Britain: 
Sandberg (1974: 142). 
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TABLE 6: Indian textile exports to Britain, 1665-1831 
 
Year Pieces  Years Pieces 
1665 291,666  1665-69 139,677 
1700 868,095  1700-04 597,978 
1750 701,485  1750-54 632,174 
1801 1,037,440  1800-04 1,355,304 
1811 691,640  1810-14 901,745 
1821 758,397  1820-24 542,117 
1831 287,814  1830-34 192,965 
 
Sources: 1665-1761: Chaudhuri (1978: Tables C.20-C.22); 1761-1834: Bowen 
(2007). 
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TABLE 7: Total Indian textile exports, 1831-1871 
 
Year Thousand 
pieces 
Value of 
cotton goods 
(Rs 000, in 
1851 prices) 
1831 3,000  
1841 2,606  
1851 2,279 7,355 
1861  8,365 
1871  14,865 
 
Sources and notes: Piece goods exports from Twomey (1983: 42); value of cotton 
goods exports from Chaudhuri (1983: 833-834, 844), converted to 1851 prices using 
unit values of imported cotton cloth sold in the Indian market from Sandberg (1974: 
260). 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 8: Urban population in India 
 
Year Population 
(millions) 
Urban  
share  
(%) 
Urban 
population 
(millions) 
1600 142 15 21.3 
1650 142 15 21.3 
1700 164 14 23.0 
1750 190 13 24.7 
1801 207 13 26.9 
1811 215 13 28.0 
1821 205 12 24.6 
1831 216 12 25.9 
1841 212 11 23.3 
1851 232 11 25.5 
1861 244 10 24.4 
1871 256 8.7 22.3 
 
Sources: Population: Table 1. Urban share: 1600, 1801: Habib (1982a: 166-171); 
1871: Visaria and Visaria (1983: 519); Other years: interpolation. 
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TABLE 9: Trends in the size of the government sector 
 
Year Government 
revenue in 
current 
prices (Rs 
million) 
GDP 
deflator 
(1871=100) 
Real 
government 
revenue (Rs 
million in 
1871 prices) 
Territory 
(1,000 
square 
miles) 
Real 
revenue per 
square mile 
(Rs in 1871 
prices) 
1600 145.9 31.1 469.1 979 479.1 
1650 228.8 69.5 329.2 1,200 274.3 
1700 333.5 80.9 412.1 1,200 343.4 
1750 309.7 96.7 320.3 1,200 267.0 
1766 30.5 96.7 31.5 98 321.8 
1801 104.9 100.3 104.5 247 423.4 
1811 166.8 107.4 155.3 353 440.4 
1821 213.5 105.0 203.3 506 401.7 
1831 220.2 105.7 208.4 514 405.4 
1841 208.5 77.5 269.2 597 450.8 
1851 276.3 71.8 384.9 771 499.3 
1861 429.0 103.8 413.5 837 494.0 
1871 514.1 100.0 514.1 904 568.7 
 
Sources and notes: Government revenue: 1600-1750 (Mughal Empire): Habib (1999: 
454-455); British Parliamentary Papers (1812: 221); the trend for 1700-1750 is based 
on the trend in Bengal. 1766-1871 (British India): British Parliamentary Papers (1773: 
535); Banerjea (1928: 78-82, 85-86, 372-373); India Office (various years); Revenues 
reported in pounds from the British period have been converted to rupees using an 
exchange rate of £1 = Rs 10 from Roy (2011). The territory from which the revenue 
was raised has been derived for the Mughal period from Habib (1982b: viii) and 
Richards (1995: 1) and for the British period from Roy (2013: 1141); Colebrooke 
(1804: 16); Schwartzberg (1978: 55-56); Phillimore (1945: plate 1); Martin (1839: 
273, 289, 332); Return to an Order of the House of Commons (1857: 16); India 
Census Commissioner (1893: 17); Bartholomew (1909: 28); Waterfield (1875: 5); 
India Office (various years). GDP deflator: weighted average of grain price and cloth 
price from Table 2. 
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TABLE 10: Indian sectoral weights, 1871 
 
 % 
Agriculture 67.5 
Domestic industry 21.5 
Export industry 0.7 
Total industry and commerce 22.2 
Services and housing 8.0 
Government 2.3 
Total economy 100.0 
 
Sources and notes: Employment structure in 1875 from Heston (1983: 396); adjusted 
for value added per employee in current prices using 1900/01 data from 
Sivasubramonian (2000: 38, 405-408). 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 11: Indian real output (1871=100) 
 
Year Agricul- 
ture 
Home 
industries 
Export 
industries 
Total 
industry 
and 
commerce 
Rent 
and 
services 
Govern 
-ment 
Total 
real 
output 
1600 67.8 72.4 148.6 80.0 95.5 84.3 71.9 
1650 63.8 67.1 148.6 75.3 95.5 48.2 67.3 
1700 72.2 74.3 202.0 87.0 103.0 60.4 75.7 
1750 76.8 84.0 213.6 97.0 110.8 46.9 81.3 
1801 79.3 90.2 457.9 127.0 120.7 74.5 87.5 
1811 76.0 82.3 304.7 104.6 125.3 77.3 82.9 
1821 74.9 78.6 183.2 89.0 110.3 70.6 79.2 
1831 77.5 84.3 65.2 82.4 116.2 71.3 81.8 
1841 82.8 97.0 56.6 92.9 104.6 79.3 87.3 
1851 91.5 105.2 49.5 99.6 114.4 87.8 95.9 
1861 89.2 112.9 56.3 107.3 109.4 86.9 95.6 
1871 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Sources and notes: Agriculture: Table 3B, total agricultural production; Home 
industries: Table 5; Export industries: Tables 6 and 7, adjusted for the growing share 
of British exports during the seventeenth century using data on bullion inflows by 
region from Haider (1996: 323); Rent and services: Table 8; Government: Table 9; 
Sectoral shares: Table 10. 
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TABLE 12: Indian per capita GDP (1871=100) 
 
Year GDP Population Per capita 
GDP 
1600 71.9 55.5 129.7 
1650 67.3 55.5 121.2 
1700 75.7 64.1 118.2 
1750 81.3 74.2 109.6 
1801 87.5 80.9 108.2 
1811 82.9 84.0 98.8 
1821 79.2 80.1 98.9 
1831 81.8 84.4 97.0 
1841 87.3 82.8 105.5 
1851 95.9 90.6 105.8 
1861 95.6 95.3 100.3 
1871 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Sources: GDP from Table 11; population from Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 13: Comparative India/GB GDP per capita 
 
 Indian GDP 
per capita 
GB GDP 
per capita 
India/GB 
GDP per 
capita 
India/GB 
GDP per 
capita 
  1871=100  GB=100 
1600 129.7 30.5 424.4 61.5 
1650 121.2 29.9 405.2 58.8 
1700 118.2 42.5 278.0 40.3 
1750 109.6 46.5 234.3 34.2 
1801 108.2 56.6 191.3 27.7 
1811 98.8 56.2 175.8 25.5 
1821 98.9 58.0 170.4 24.7 
1831 97.0 63.9 151.7 22.0 
1841 105.5 71.1 148.4 21.5 
1851 105.8 81.5 129.8 18.8 
1861 100.3 90.1 111.4 16.2 
1871 100.0 100.0 100.0 14.5 
 
Sources and notes: Indian GDP per capita from Table 12; GB GDP per capita 1600-
1870: from Broadberry et al., (2011); 1870-1871 from Feinstein (1972: T18); GB 
population: Mitchell (1988: 9-12). Comparative India/GB GDP per capita level in 
1871 derived from Broadberry and Gupta (2010), adjusting from a UK to a GB basis 
using Irish shares of GDP and population from Crafts (2005: 56) and Feinstein (1972: 
Table 55). 
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TABLE 14: Indian and British GDP per capita, 1600-1871 (1990 international 
dollars) 
 
Year Indian GDP 
per capita 
GB GDP 
per capita 
1600 682 1,123 
1650 638 1,100 
1700 622 1,563 
1750 576 1,710 
1801 569 2,080 
1811 519 2,065 
1821 520 2,133 
1831 510 2,349 
1841 555 2,613 
1851 556 2,997 
1861 528 3,311 
1871 526 3,657 
 
Sources: Derived from Table 13 and Maddison (2010). 
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TABLE 15: A benchmark estimate of India/GB GDP per capita, circa 1600 
 
Mughal Empire  
Nominal GDP (Rs m) 559.68 
Population (m) 85.2 
GDP per capita (Rs) 6.57 
  
England  
Nominal GDP (£m) 23.28 
Population (m) 4.11 
GDP per capita (£) 5.66 
  
Exchange rates  
Silver exchange rate (Rs per £) 8.00 
Wheat price PPP (Rs per £) 1.63 
  
Comparative GDP per capita  
At silver exchange rate 14.5 
At wheat price PPP 71.2 
 
Sources and notes: Mughal Empire: Nominal GDP in dams from Moosvi (2008: 2-3), 
noting that a rupee is 40 dams (Habib, 1999: 440); Population obtained by applying 
Moreland’s [1923] ratio of 60 per cent of total Indian population to Habib’s (1982a) 
figure of 142 million; England: nominal GDP and population from Broadberry et al., 
(2011); Silver exchange rate: Chaudhuri (1978: 471); PPP: Indian wheat price from 
Abū’l-Fazl (1595: 65. Price of Rs 0.30 per man of 55.32 lb is equal to Rs 0.005424 
per lb (Heston, 1977: 393); English wheat price of 32 s per quarter of 480 lb from 
Mitchell (1988: 754) is equal to £0.00333 per lb. An Indian price of Rs 0.005424 per 
lb and an English price of £0.00333 per lb yields a wheat price PPP of £1 = Rs 1.63. 
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FIGURE 1: Indian per capita incomes as a percentage of British per capita 
incomes (GB=100) 
 
 
 
Sources: Table 13; Broadberry and Gupta (2006). 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2: Alternative estimates of Indian GDP per capita (1990 international 
dollars) 
 
 
 
Sources: Table 14; Maddison (2010). 
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